The region known as Nagorno Karabakh is a mountainous territory of about 4,500 km2 to the east of Azerbaijan and bordering Armenia. Although legally this region is Azerbaijani, in 2017 a constitutional referendum took place that gave rise to the republic (not recognized by any UN member country) of Nagorno-Karabakh (called Artsakh). Artsakh proclaims itself independent, but in practice, is controlled by Armenia and the region has been disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan for more than thirty years, never reaching a peace agreement. Certain clashes eventually break out, but since one of the bloodiest episodes in April 2016 which left more than two hundred dead in a few days, the most serious escalation has taken place in September 2020. With a not very favourable to dialogue international arena and growing nationalism in both countries, the dispute is far from glimpsing a solution and the potential ceasefire that could be agreed now will soon be broken again.
One year after the confrontation of both countries over the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2016, the Crisis Group think tank report on current international conflicts warned, given the lack of diplomatic progress between Armenia and Azerbaijan at the time, about the risk of new hostilities that could lead to the displacement or death of civilians and the escalation of the conflict beyond its regional scale. Currently, the seriousness of the events that occurred in the last two months has placed this conflict in the focus of the media. However, the origins of the dispute over this territory date back to the dissolution of the Russian Empire, where the Democratic Republic of Armenia and the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan emerged. When both became part of the Soviet Union in 1920, Stalin decided that Karabakh would remain within Azerbaijan as an autonomous region, although the population claimed to belong to Armenia. At the end of the 1980s, these demands were pronounced, but Azerbaijan refused, since 1988 leading to displacement and deaths of civilians from both countries. Following the fall of the USSR and the independence of its states, Nagorno-Karabakh held an independence referendum, which sparked disputes between an Armenian majority and an Azeri minority and led to a war that dragged on until international pressure forced a ceasefire in 1994. Currently, although without any international recognition, the region declares itself independent as the Republic of Artsakh, legally belongs to Azerbaijan and in practice acts under the protection and control of Armenia.
Since 1992 with the creation of the OSCE Minsk Group forum led by Russia, the United States and France, the international community has promoted some unsuccessful attempts to resolve the conflict. The lack of will between the parties and the lack of international pressure also failed to reach an agreement in the negotiations of the Madrid Principles in 2007. Despite the little presence of this conflict in the media and the apparent abandonment of the international community, the clashes in the area have never completely ceased, with different incidents occurring since 2015 and both countries gradually increasing their military spending. Azerbaijan, however, with great wealth in hydrocarbons, can afford a much higher military spending than Armenia. Given the preparation of both states and the international context that has favoured so, the current conflict was foreseeable.
As neighbour countries facing each other for decades, the most useful political tool to maintain social cohesion within this conflict is to nurture a strong national sentiment, that is, by using nationalism to justify a forceful response from the slightest aggression from the adversary. Armenia, with fewer economic and energy resources than Azerbaijan, experienced a revolution in 2018 that brought to power a new generation of leaders led by Nikol Pashinian, seen by some analysts at the time as an opportunity to resume negotiations with Azerbaijan. Pashinian, to avoid putting his popularity at risk and consolidating his power, soon changed the ambiguity with which he dealt with the conflict at the beginning for a strongly nationalist discourse, even declaring that Karabakh is part of Armenia and not an independent republic. This discourse has intensified lately due to internal political instability and the economic crisis aggravated by the current pandemic. The coronavirus crisis has also hit Azerbaijan hard, whose exports, which are 90% oil and gas, have plummeted. Although since the fall of oil price in 2014 Azerbaijan began to diversify its economy to reduce its vulnerability due to its dependence on the energy market prices, this has not prevented the current crisis from highlighting the problems that the country, dominated by an authoritarian regime headed by the Aliyev family since its independence, is dragging. Despite Azerbaijan’s attempts to maintain the stability of its economy, the discontent of its population has grown considerably. In addition, recent military clashes with Armenia resulting in the death of several top Azerbaijani commanders generated protests, demonstrations and a wave of volunteers willing to fight, which has also fueled the nationalist discourse. This context is undoubtedly favourable for war, but it is not the only thing that has motivated the military clash.
The international context surrounding this conflict is currently characterized by international uncertainty in the markets and growing state debt marked by the pandemic, changes in the foreign policy of the powers in the region and insecurity facing the upcoming United States elections. While during the 2016 conflict the United States led the negotiations and called for dialogue, currently US focus is on its domestic politics. Turkey has filled this power vacuum, fueled by new interests and setting aside its traditional conciliatory position for dialogue to make way for a more aggressive foreign policy. Although Turkey has always had a historical enmity with Armenia and a close alliance with Azerbaijan, this time the Turkish government has more openly supported Azerbaijan in its offensive to regain the territories controlled by Armenia and has revealed joint military manoeuvres in August. The rest of the powers involved observe Turkey’s change as a source of instability added to the absence of the United States plus the European Union being unable to agree on a firm foreign policy in this regard. Therefore, Azerbaijan has taken advantage of this context to launch an offensive to regain its territory that, although it may not be definitive, will allow facing future negotiations with its power strengthened. For its part, Russia maintains a position of mediator between the two countries with which it shares a Soviet past but is commonly seen as an ally of Armenia, which hosts the Russian military base of Guiumri on its territory. However, Turkey’s current support for Azerbaijan has disrupted Russia’s delicate balance and hampered its diplomatic efforts. While Azerbaijan is a large buyer of Russian weapons, Russia and Armenia belong to the post-Soviet military alliance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), committed to defending each other, although it would only be forced to intervene militarily if the Armenian official territory is at risk and Moscow does not recognize the Republic of Artsakh. In addition, another Russian concern is the jihadist problem in the Caucasus, which could become complicated since Azerbaijan includes in its troops hired fighters from the Syrian conflict. On the other hand, the dispute over the Karabakh could also have consequences for the conflicts in Syria and Libya where Russia and Turkey support opposing sides.
By observing the great background of this conflict, it could be foreseen that this confrontation will not soon provide a definitive solution. Given the military superiority, more powerful economy, international legitimacy over the area endorsed by UN resolutions, and the support of Turkey, Azerbaijan has a better chance of being victorious. However, the majority of Armenians living in the territory and who consider this area their home will not easily accept this resolution. The peace process is not favoured by growing nationalism and polarization in both states, which have lost confidence in dialogue forums such as the Minsk Group, which reflects the inability of the international community to promote a solution to it. Azerbaijan will continue to exercise its power by securing a stronger position until gaining pressure from Russia to force Armenia to return to a dialogue in which Azerbaijan can afford to ask for more concessions. However, even if an agreement could be put in place, it seems that the conflict would again be frozen until the next confrontation instead of being definitively resolved since the leaders of both countries find in this dispute a very useful political tool to consolidate their power. This seems to lead to the end of the conflict being seen as something very, very distant.
Word Count: 1400
Student Number: 219456
Tutor: Dr Clemens Hoffman
Useful references:
Aljazeera (Inphograpics) (2020) Infographic: Military arsenals of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
De Waal, T. (2020) The Caucasus Burns While Europe Struggles. CARNEGIE EUROPE
De Waal, T. (2020) United States Power Vacuum Risks Escalating Violence in Armenia-Azerbaijan. CARNEGIE EUROPE
Dragadze, T. (1989) The Armenian: Azerbaijani Conflict: Structure and Sentiment.Third World Quarterly, 11 (1), pp. 55-71.
GRAMER, R. and DETSCH, J. (2020) Turkey’s Caucasus Adventure Risk Another Crisis in NATO. Foreign Policy.
International Crisis Group (2017) Watch List 2017. 3.
Pierini, M. (2020) The EU Must Persuade Turkey That Permanent Disruption Comes With Disastrous Consequences. Le Monde, CARNEGIE EUROPE.
Political Geography Now (2020) Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) Control Map & Timeline – October 2, 2020.
(2020) Russia’s Security Guarantees for Armenia Don’t Extend to Karabakh, Putin Says. The Moscow Times.
Simão, L. (2017) The Nagorno-Karabakh redux. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).
Stronell, A. (2020) Renewed fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan: what makes it different this time? International Institute for Strategic Studies.
Turkey’s support role complicates latest Nagorno-Karabakh flare-up. Financial Times.