Death and Destruction Group 3

The way Duchen describes the abuse and rape of women makes it sound like humans exist like a pack of animals. Although I can agree that the violence used against the women was brutal, the way Duchen argues it almost takes away the human choice from those who punished the women. The violence against the women was a choice and not an instinct. Nowhere in the narrative does Duchen compare humans and animals, however this is the interpretation I got from reading this chapter.
As Claire Duchen was a feminist historian (which I support by the way) it is no surprise that the narration and argument may come across as strong minded. The symbolism of sexual violence against women is a convincing argument.

Deák’s chapter talks about the crimes committed by the Nazis during WWII and how the culprits across Europe were punished. Such as local executions and the Nürnberg trials. Deák also mentions the punishment inflicted upon women who had interacted with Nazis, and how French women had their hair shaved.
Deák argues the difference between the Nürnberg trials and the local, sometimes public, executions of Nazi supporters etc. The Nürnberg trials were held by the Americans and mostly focused on Nazis that had direct contribution to the Nazi schemes or contribution to the Holocaust. Additionally, the Nürnberg trials was a way to show power over Germany’s defeat, broadcasted to most corners of the world, and quite grand.
Meanwhile the local executions were bloody, brutal and even barbaric. Such as the stoning of the body of Mussolini and his wife. There was no patience or sympathy towards the Nazis when the public saw red.
Both sources use the photographs taken by Robert Capa, and interprets them in similar, yet also different ways. Duchen seems convinced that the harassment afflicted upon the women who had their heads shaven was violence against women, because they were vulnerable women, and not entirely because they had relations with Nazis.
Deák has a more explanatory way of approaching the events and focuses more on the punishment as a local disciplining situation rather than a crime against females.
Nonetheless, both are equally convincing in their narratives.

Group 3 is smaller than the other group so there is no designated blogger for this week. I have added this space for anyone to add their thoughts and reflections in the comments below.

Any comments will contribute to your engagement grade, but I will not penalise anyone for not contributing this week.

What do you make of these readings? Were they all very different? Were there common ideas/themes?

Immie McCalman

Bartov, Omer, ‘Eastern European as the Site for Genocide’, Journal of Modern History, vol. 80, no.3 (2008), pp. 557-593

Omer Bartov analyses and outlines some of the main issues surrounding the Holocaust and its affect in Eastern European countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Ukraine. He explores the relationship between memory and the site, documentation and forgetting, professional conventions and historical responsibility. Bartov argues that despite years of scholarship surrounding the genocide of Jewish people, the sites of their execution outside of Auschwitz are given little attention and those who experienced first-hand the destruction from the Nazi regime are ignored in Eastern Europe.

The article is broken down into different subsections: 1) Bifurcated Scholarship, 2) Opening Pandoras Box, 3) Communal Massacre, 4) The Economy of Genocide, 5) Testimony and History and 6) Eastern Europe as Lieu De Memoire. Through these different parts Bartov highlights that Eastern Europe is covered in countless sites in which large parts of history have been completely erased – he explains that those killed were thrown into mass graves not far from where they called home and the sites of life and death are generally vaguely known. Bartov recalls them as sites of forgetting, rather than sites of remembering and remorse. The memory of Jewish life and death in Eastern Europe detached from the sites in which life was lived and murder perpetrated.

Bartov supports the idea that there is bifurcated scholarship regarding Jewish genocide; he discusses that many historians lean on what happened to the victims once they were in the concentration camps rather than where the victims were ripped away from. Whereas the rest ponder on the relationship between the Jewish victims and their gentile neighbours and the little attention that is given to this notion over the German perpetrator.

The situation regarding Jewish death in Eastern Europe changed after the fall of communism. Bartov uses the available access to Eastern European files to explain how Western views on Eastern Europe have been transformed: revealing that the massacre of Jews by their own Polish neighbours proves that the innocent were in fact killers- turned into tools of the Nazi genocide policy. Furthermore, the new narrative introduces Poles into the Holocaust as active protagonists. Bartov claims that precise regions of Eastern Europe where population was dense, murder rates were high and non-Jews were threatened and brutalized to turn on their neighbours. Viewing the Holocaust for Eastern Europeans as very much a communal genocide, public murders were became a part of everyday life; with those who sheltered Jews also denouncing them. Bartov explains that the fear of the victims own neighbours and friends added onto the fear of the Nazi regime.

Additionally, Bartov depicts the crucial role property and capital played in the implementation of the Holocaust- believing that genocide served was a mechanism for social mobility to non-Jews. Yet Bartov states that most historians are reluctant to use Jewish testimonies when reconstructing the Holocaust’s effect in Eastern Europe because the Holocaust had an incomparably greater overall impact on Eastern European countries because populations were greater.

Overall, this article focuses on how Eastern Europe remains the heart of the Holocaust, both physically and socially. Bartov provides evidence for why he thinks the effects of genocide have been discarded and issues of motivation are more complex as the link between higher and lower levels of “ethnic cleansing” can be grasped clearer from first hand and local perspectives of people living in these areas that held communal massacres. Bartov concludes with the idea that the Lieu de Memoire is in the fields and hills, the riverbanks and towns of Eastern Europe.

 

Bloxham, Donald. “Organized Mass Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motivation in Comparative Perspective.” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 22, no.2 (2008): 203-245.

Donald Bloxham writes about how organisational structures have taken part in key roles in modern state-sponsored mass murder. Bloxham criticises and combines present scholarship by focusing first on historiographical debates about the Holocaust. Bloxham then writes about other events of state-sponsored mass murder including the Stalinist purges, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Armenian Genocide and other theoretical literature. Bloxham shows the ways in which organisational systems and individuals have worked together with other motives to form the behaviour of mass murderers in distinct historical events.

The article breaks down into several parts such as: 1) Comparing Structures and States, 2) Organizing the Final Solution, 3) Two Snapshots: The USSR and Rwanda, and 4) The Armenian Genocide: Whither Bureaucracy?

Bloxham argues that organisational structures provide more than the collection of things, people, and parts to any activity. The division of labour brings in a reasonably high degree of efficiency per person as the larger the scale and difficulty of the task, the larger and more refined the model organisational structure is, and thus the more distinguished the division of labour within or among its component parts. Modern states are particularly suited to large tasks such as mass murder, because of their control over powerful bodies of administration and coercion. Because of its special authority, it may also legitimately justify broad participation, regardless of the activity horrific or not.

Bloxham states that it would be incorrect to infer that traditional bureaucrats and bureaucracies (i.e., those called upon to destroy people they had previously administered) cannot carry out a vital role in mass murder as in the Final Solution, the genocide would not have been what it was without the involvement of many pre-Nazi agencies of the German state and bureaucracies in allied or vassal states. In all cases, organisations had to rely on perpetrators with various balances of commitment and motivation. A great deal of enticement increased the capacity of the machineries of destruction by motivating agencies and individuals in both the public and private sectors. Furthermore, Bloxham writes that there was a high level of civilian participation in Rwanda as a great deal of those directly involved used machetes to kill than guns. The participation and actions in the Soviet Union were carried out more by bureaucratic and policing institutions. The Armenian Genocide however featured less administrative and bureaucratic culprits despite the mass ethnic cleansing.

I think Bloxham should included the Herero and Namaqua genocide in his comparisons of state-sponsored mass murders as a compelling contrast between the German states (German Empire and Nazi Germany) can be made in terms of structure, participation, motivations, etc. Also, the Second Boer War in which concentration camps are utilised compared to the Holocaust.

Apologies for this blog being late.

 

 

 

Nicola Hamilton

Stone, Dan, ‘The Holocaust: Child of Modernity’ in Histories of the Holocaust. (Oxford, 2010). Pp 113-159

Dan Stone in his chapter analyses the ‘modernity’ debate surrounding the Holocaust and examines to what extent the Holocaust came as a result of modernity. Debates about modernity asks whether the Holocaust was brought around not by ‘medieval barbarianism’ but rather by the logic of modernity itself. Ultimately, instead of understanding the Holocaust as a return to an earlier tradition of murderous Jew hatred, seen in the First Crusade, Stone attempts to examine the roots of the Holocaust from modern race science. Characteristics of modern society such as; technology, bureaucracy, state control over populations and the idea that nation states should be threatened by difference, all gave a rise to genocide which could not have been done in pre-modern conditions. 

Zygmunt Bauman supports Stone’s claim as Bauman argued that the Holocaust was an outcome of modernity itself, rather than a throwback to pre-modern barbarianism. He did not think that the Holocaust was one of the necessary outcomes of modernity but he did believe that it was one of its many ‘hidden possibilities’. Through Bauman’s argument it is clear to understand that bureaucracy was an essential part of the Holocaust but whether it was an essential characteristic or carrier is questioned. 

Nazi ideology was extremely widespread and promoted by influential individuals. The murder of Jews, according to Stone, was driven by Nazi’s paranoid conspiracy theory of the world. While Nazi propaganda was filled with antisemitic imagery, there is no clear root as to what drove individuals to take part in genocide. Jürgen Matthäus and Edward Westermann’s essay states that the SS and the Order Police structured and legitimised murderous antisemitism even before the ‘Jewish question’ was raised – highlighting an individual perpetrator motivation. In terms of perpetrator institutions, Stone claims modernity was less of a driving force for the Holocaust than the setting for it. When examining the workings of these agencies and the individuals who worked for them, capabilities in these institutions varied but they all stared a common goal in targeting Jews. This picture of Nazi institutions creates a weak version of the modernity argument as the predominance of bureaucratisation, instrumental thinking and rationalisation was not the motor of the Holocaust but rather the channel through which it was carried. So, while historians claim that modernity was a driving force for the Holocaust, they fail to mention where the idea for exterminating Jewish people came from. 

Moreover, Stone considers what Nazi agencies’ role in terms of modernity was. The Wirtschafts-Verwaltungshauptant (WVHA) was founded in 1942 and led by Oswald Pohl. As of March 1942, the WVHA controlled the concentration camps and managed a huge economic empire with 40,000 employees who oversaw half a million concentration camp inmates. The WVHA used modern techniques of combining bureaucratic procedures and legal norms in order to control the concentration camps. The transition to gas chambers indicated to most historians that something modern was occurring; “erection of extermination camps signified the decisive step in the history of genocide’s development” (p 145), as previously a firing squad would have been used to massacre a group of people. Michael Thad Allen agued that plans for erecting gas chambers in Auschwitz can be dated to October-November 1941. Therefore, Allen states that modernity alone can not account for the emergence of a death camp in Auschwitz and the mission to exterminate Jews was the prerequisite for this effort, not a product of it. 

Overall, in terms of architecture, technology and the state of infrastructure – especially railways – the Holocaust can be defined as ‘modern’. Frank Bajor claims that “the mass murder of European Jews would not have been possible in its vast dimensions without the institutions of a modern bureaucratic state” (p 158). Through the studies of Nazi agencies and the concentration camps which Stone examined, it shows that modernity was vital to the implementation of the Holocaust but does not account for the origin of Nazi ideas to murder millions of Jews. 

Chloe Fergus

Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts: Reflections on the Disputable Path from Windhoek to Auschwitz by Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski.

This article tackles the continuity theory between the Holocaust conducted in Germany against Jewish people between 1941-1945 and critically compares it to the previous German ‘genocide’ and colonial conquest of Herero and Nama in Southwest Africa in 1904.

Throughout the article, Gerwarth and Malinowski draw upon several other historians opinions and examine them. They note Zimmerer who claims that there are ‘African roots’ to the holocaust and if they are ignored, then a crucial element is being overlooked in explaining the context of the Nazis mass murder of European Jewry. He states the colonial conquest was a “decisive link to the crimes of the Nazis” and the Herero war was the starting point of a genocidal path, ending in the Holocaust. He even goes as far to say that the Nazi war of extermination and murder of the Jews would likely not have been possible without this colonial experience. This argument is countered by recent general histories of the Third Reich in which Germany’s colonial past plays no role whatsoever.

Continuity regarding the use of concentration camps is drawn upon by Benjamin Madley suggesting that the idea of the camps was first tested in German South-West Africa and that the Nazis borrowed ideas and methods from the previous ‘genocide’ that they employed and expanded upon. Gerwarth and Malinowski tackle these historical interpretations and argue that their chronological and spatial boundaries are not clear. They pin-point Zimmerer’s case and argue that in his articles on the war against Herero and Nama are of central focus but in other publications, the German colonial massacres of 1904 are only used as one example amongst many others.

Hannah Ardent argues that neither Germans nor the Nazis were responsible for investing racial theories and her interpretation is based largely on anti-Semitism, racism and colonialism as European phenomena’s. The violation of 1904 had been much within standard European colonial standards and practices and did not merit an exceptionally shocking level of violence in accordance with European colonialism.

Gerwarth and Malinowski utilise three other examples of colonial mass violence that could be deemed as genocides, all of which took place before German interference in Southwest Africa. The American conquest of the Philippines (1898-1902), the Spanish colonial wars in Cuba (1895-1898) and French massacres in Algeria (1830-1872). These examples are drawn upon to emphasise that violence, systematic destruction, racist legislation and attacks on culture were standard procedure rather than an exceptional “taboo violation”. The three examples are analysed, and parallels are drawn such as racist criteria and viewing groups as inferior in which Americans viewed natives as “savages” and ordered anyone over the age of ten to be shot. This correlates with Trotha’s “extermination order” of 1904. Furthermore, the death rate of the American colonial conquest in the Philippines exceeded the death rate several times over compared to that of German Southwest Africa.

The Spanish-Cuban war also had parallels, not only with the use of mass violence but with the use of concentration camps. This “successful” policy was in turn used by the Americans in the Philippines, the British in South Africa and the Germans in Southwest Africa, this therefore contrasts what Madley stated previously.

The French conquest of Algeria is an early example of racist discourses and colonial conquest and extermination. In this case there were between 250,000 to 900,000 largely civilians victims – men, women and children. It is repeatedly emphasised however, that in the Western context of violence this was nothing out of the ordinary since it was Western powers who dominated the colonial field.

Gerwarth and Malinowski draw upon WW1 Germany and their experience of defeat, civil war and revolution as of great importance in explaining an enhanced willingness to use violence which opposes the continuity theory. Another objection to the continuity proposition is the lack of personal links between 1904 and 1941. “Knowledge transfers” between generations is feasible however, those still alive from the 1904 conquest would have much aged and likely had very little impact on a German army that exceeded 3 million at the beginning of its efforts.

The role of the developed bureaucratic terror apparatus of the Third Riech is also noted in which they collaborated willingly in Nazi Germany but not in German Southwest Africa 1904. Hannah Ardent claims that racism was not an inherently German attitude and was a result of colonialism. To further this, issue lies with the difference between colonial, colour-coded and European anti-Semitism and that colonial racism was directed at non-Europeans (in other words, non-whites). Bartov highlights that the “Jewish enemy” who were deemed alien to European civilisation could also physically appear as European and be ‘disguised’. This draws upon the differences between the 1904 colonial conquest and the Holocaust as one was racially motivated and was colour-based racism where civilians were viewed as ‘inferior’ and the other was an anti-Semitic attack.

Overall, the narrative of the article appears to disassociate Windhoek to Auschwitz and claim they were two very separate events, at different times, under different leaderships with different ideologies and motives. It also plays down the violence conducted at Windhoek stating that this was somewhat the ‘norm’ for the time. Although parallels between the two are stated and analysed, Gerwarth and Malinowski present a strong thought-provoking argument against the continuity theory. They argue that Hannah Ardents proposed theory of racist imperialism as a laboratory for totalitarianism needs further empirical evidence however, they do recognise some plausible parallels between Windhoek and Auschwitz.

 

Molly McAllister

Benjamin Madley, ‘From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe’

This article highlights the comparability of the ideology and methods demonstrated within German-colonised South West Africa and Eastern Europe. 

Throughout this article, Madley calls attention to the fact that the actions and methods used in the second world war towards Eastern Europeans did not follow the patterns set in German South-West Africa by coincidence, but because they borrowed these ideals and expanded upon them. He highlights the fact that the policy of annihilation used in the South West African genocide was unheard of in other mass murders taking place throughout Africa, and the policy was adopted by the Germans in the East through Nazi rule. 

The implementation of Ratzel’s Lebensraum theory in South-West Africa helped to premise Nazi colonial expansion and settlement with the aspiration to obtain ‘living space’. Ratzel built the theory under the assumption and notion that ‘superior cultures’ destroy ‘inferior cultures’ in fights for living space, therefore justifying the violence against the South-West Africans. This was the same logic Hitler used within Eastern Europe when he wrote of ‘the right to possess soil’ and German racial superiority.

Additionally, Madley highlights that German South West African colonists introduced the implementation of a Weltanschauung which was later adopted by the Nazis, in which superior Germans ruled over sub-human non-Germans with brutality and slavery. This concept can be shown in both South-West Africa and Eastern Europe with the enslavement of both peoples.

Ideologies first trialed in South-West Africa also made their way to Eastern Europe as the  German South-West Africa’s 1905 law banning Rassenmischung, or race mixing, it is not surprising that Nazis used vocabulary nearly identical to these laws when they criminalised marriage and sexual intercourse between Jews and ‘Aryan’ Germans.

Furthermore, the concept of concentration camps in South-West Africa were used as a template for Third Reich concentration camps such as Buchenwald and Dachau. Madley highlights that Von Trotha’s camps were unofficially divided into two categories: camps geared simply to kill, and work camps where prisoners were worked under conditions that led to death and their purpose was to extract economic value from prisoners in conditions which camp administrators anticipated would lead to mass casualties which shows clear similarities to concentration camps which imprisoned millions of eastern Europeans.

Overall, this article focuses on the Third Reich leaders borrowing ideas and methods from the German South-West African genocide that they employed and expanded upon. Through the use of genocidal rhetoric, the Lebensraum theory, the brutal treatment of colonised people as sub-humans, and the use of legally institutionalised racism, and deporting prisoners of war and noncombatants to work and death camps, they were all introduced to modern German history in the violence against Eastern Europeans through the South-West African experience.

Violence and Community Sven Reichardt – James C.

Reichardt’s article tells us that the SA’S ‘sturm 33’ was particularly known for street fighting in Germany. The methods employed by them meant that in cases of attacks there was no doubt as to who was responsible for it. The members all shared the same aims, and that the SA became a way of life for its members. The article talks of ‘comradeship’ which I think is an interesting choice of word as it suggests unity among them. The unity in this case links to the glorification of violence. The SA is united in its hate for Communists, Social Democrats, and Jewish people. The strategy of violence was successful the bloodshed experienced brough publicity that gave the Nazis a platform to further their ambitions. The SA troops were male dominated, young, and uncompromising. The marches they had gave them the character of an anti-socialist workers movement. Every unit was led by a Sturmfuher a chosen Nazi leader. The leader was a man of the people with particular allegiance towards them. To ensure the leaders survival there had to be what Reichardt says as a ‘rigid and loose power relationship with the followers.’ In the case of the SA-Sturm 33 their Leader Hahn felt a special affinity to the military and had joined an anti-Semitic organisation prior to becoming leader of the SA-Strum 33. This shows that Hahn was a proper candidate to lead this SA group as he was experienced and had paramilitary experience. The article discusses reasons why young men joined the SA. It was often linked to unemployment. The great depression had left a lasting effect on Germany and many SA agents signed up because they were unemployed. This connection as made by a Social Democrat Newspaper who states the connection was a ‘self-evident mechanism.’ Unemployment within the SA was often high and conveys the idea that the SA was a poor underfunded organisation. The movement was attractive to the young men as their slogans suggested there could be radical change and that this could be achieved through demonstrations etc. Reichardt states that a descending social trajectory was responsible for an increase in membership of the Charlottenburg SA. They often felt they did not belong to a particular group and found solace in the SA. The SA offered a network of contacts that removed the feeling of social isolationism. It envisaged men to have a better future. The groups attacks were often linked to violent outbursts due to excessive alcohol consumption. They often carried out attacks so they could get praise from the Sturmfuhrer and respect among their comrades. This was how physical violence became an acceptance within the group.

 

Chris Millington ‘Street fighting men: Political Violence in Inter-War France’ by Robert Canth

 

In his article “Street Fighting men” Chris Millington argues that the prevalence of violence in the inter-war third republican France is often over-looked and not sufficiently analysed, compared to its European contemporaries of belligerence, such as Germany and Britain. He narrates how the nature of the violence was different and highly symbolic due to inherently democratic political circumstances in France; referring to the ‘highly influential’ thesis of Serge Berstein. Statistically, France seemed to have been less violent to other European states under political upheaval, even though the concerned groups made constant threats in the press. However, Millington argues that mere numbers alone can not elaborate the violent nature of society at the time. What interests me, is why Millington does not mention how the outcome of the war might have affected the prevalence of such violence, for while the war had been bitter and devastating for all, the amount of humiliation and the eventual search for the culprits in Germany surely played its part.

Millington discusses how the ‘legitimate and illegitimate violence’ by the notions of ‘manliness’ were manifestations of a ‘bitter struggle’ between the right and the left. He refers to how the different parliamentary entities – some of which had turned totalitarian, conducted themselves in the struggle for political dominance in the 1920 and how France saw the emergence of the Extreme right, while the left under the left-wing Cartel Des Gauches eventually failed to topple the government. While talking about how ‘the Communist Party had abandoned the idea of using a proletarian militia’ by the late 1920s, the article points out how later the worldwide economic depression also affected the rise of the far-right in groups such as Solidarité Française (SF) and Croix de Feu (CF). Millington describes how such tensions led to an escalation in 1934, when the nationalist riot against government corruption took place claiming multiple casualties.

The article emphasizes how the public encounters between the groups was an important aspect to assert dominance and Millington proceeds to describe them in detail, for example how the weaponry consisted mainly of items suited for hand to hand combat such as knuckledusters and knives. He also argues that the leagues and the communists made sure to recruit the right calibre of men to their shock-troop and defence sections.

After describing vividly the events of the turbulent 1920s and 1930s the article concludes on how the enemies of the republic failed to seize control like in Italy and Germany. The article does not point out how the result of the German invasion could have been unifying in terms of how the political violence ended, par the left wing attacks on the German forces and the eventual executions of 10 000 collaborators.

 

‘Under the Sign of Mars: Violence in European Civil Wars, 1917–1949’ by Javier Rodrigo

Rodrigo sets the ambitious objective to develop a framework for the comparison of the various civil wars occurring in Europe during the first half of the 20th century. Focusing on European civil wars between 1917 and 1949, he tries to disentangle the logic of these conflicts from the resulting violence: whereas civil wars are internal struggles for power and control, violence is instrumental in the retention of such power and the transformation of society.

A strong emphasis is given on the multi-dimensional dynamic of civil wars, which originate from multiple factors, occurring at various levels (macro to micro), and involving a variety of actors. Hence, examining the reasons for violence requires delving into ideological, cultural, political, economic, and identity-related factors at the local, regional, national, and international levels.

Taking a macro-level perspective at first, Rodrigo finds a common ground between the contemporary civil and international wars: both took civilians as their primary targets, thus contributing to the erosion of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Then, he focuses on Russia (from 1917 to 1923), considered to be the first significant internal conflict in Europe. It was based upon the enmity opposing the revolutionary Reds and the counter-revolutionary Whites: both conducted a political cleansing among the population and sought to annihilate their respective adversary. On the one hand, around 250,000 “enemies of the people” were executed by the Bolsheviks, along with 500,000 Cossacks deported. On the other hand, about 100,000 to 150,000 people were killed by the Tsarists in Ukraine alone.

The case of the Finnish civil war (winter-spring 1918) presents similarities to the conflict in Russia, for it was triggered following fragmentation of sovereignty. However, the emergence of fascism in Europe complexified the subsequent internal struggles, which do not fit the “revolutionaries versus counter-revolutionaries” setting.

In Spain for example, the counter-revolution was pre-emptive, to stop the advancing socialism. The Spanish civil war also stands out for its unprecedented, institutionalized brutality: almost 3% of the population were killed in 1936, notably following the establishment of people’s and military tribunals.

The period 1939-45 saw the juxtaposition of several factors, at various levels: total, national, political, and class wars coincided with wars of religion. This multiplicity of elements added to the enduring non-recognition of “bystanders” (i.e. non-participants) is at the core of the intense violence – which would also characterize the ensuing civil wars in Yugoslavia and Greece.

Yet, given the variety of factors, levels, and actors involved in the internal conflicts of that time, one may question the relevance of Rodrigo’s approach: beyond the obvious “multi-directional nature” of civil wars, is there anything to link European internal struggles to one another? Rodrigo argues that fascism becomes the common denominator of civil wars following Russia; however, were they all about/due to fascism? If so, Rodrigo would probably fail to account for the micro-level of interpretation that he emphasizes at the beginning of the paper. Unfortunately, in trying to cover such a large number of conflicts, his account gets dispersed and lacks a well-structured narrative thread.

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‘The Genesis of Russian Warlordism: Violence and Governance during the First World War and the Civil War’ by Joshua Sanborn

Only seven journals used the term “warlord” in their titles between 1966 and 1993, and none of these titles were about Russia. According to Joshua Sanborn, in his article “The Genesis of Russian Warlordism: Violence and Governance during the First World War and the Civil War”, the period of 1915-1925 was a decade of warlords in Eurasia. Sanborn defines a warlord as “a military commander who autonomously exercises political power through the threatening use of force” (p. 197). Sanborn defines two conditions for warlordism to appear: the failure of the state, and candidates with military experience, authority, and ambition.

The first condition exposed by Sanborn is state collapse. During World War 1, martial law was introduced in the Western Russian territory, this included curfews, searches of homes and businesses, the deportation of undesirables, fixed prices, trade restrictions, labor requirements, censorship, removal of local officials, and harassment of civilian relief agencies. This led to a sense of anarchy in civilian life, along with insecurity. The territory also had to face ethnic cleansing against Germans and Jews. All of these events and policies led to a certain amount of distrust towards the government, as the state lost legitimacy and power.

The second condition needed is to have candidates with military experience, authority, and ambition. According to Sanborn, without ambition, one simply cannot become a warlord. For example, General Ianushkevich controlled both military and political life but was not a warlord as he lacked the ambition to take power. During the February Revolution, revolutionaries lacked legitimacy and a coherent political program. The Soviets gave their soldiers the right to disobey orders which caused an increase in insubordination. This collapse of discipline is what pushed men like Lavr Kornilov to become warlords. Kornilov used terror to govern and became both a political and military leader. He was the leader of a “Savage Division” that committed atrocities like executions and mass deportations. Kornilov believed that dictatorship was necessary to save the army. Following the October Revolution, he became the leader of the Volunteer Army which opposed the Red Army. This conflict led to a lot of atrocities being committed against civilians, especially against Jews as they were seen as being “Red”. Another example of warlordism is the Baron Roman von Ungern-Shternberg who occupied the city of Urga (Ulaanbaatar, capital of Mongolia) for a short period of time, under which his men caused various bloodsheds and massacres.

Although Sanborn explains a lot about the warlords themselves, he passes over rather quickly on the political situation of the time and keeps the focus on the opponents of the Red Army. He also passes very briefly on the warlords’ motivations and influences. A lot of what happened in the Russian territory at that time can be linked back to the French Revolutions, particularly the use of Terror. It is also interesting that the opponents of the Bolsheviks targeted Jews by saying that Jewish people were communists since it is the exact same argument used by Hitler during his rise to power. Overall Sanborn focuses a lot on the military aspect of warlordism while pushing aside a more social and civilian aspect, as I think it would be interesting to get a look at the different perspectives of the people involved.

Suss, ‘ The War of the Future’ (Morgan M)

In this chapter, Suss focuses on aerial warfare during the First World War and then during the inter-war period until 1939. He first discusses how during the First World War; aerial warfare was not yet advanced, and it was primarily the use of Zeppelins used in order to attack the enemy on their home soil. Suss describes the attacks on London as significant as it was highlighted for the first time that the British population could not be safeguarded despite being far from the fighting on the front line. These German air raids were described by the British people as barbaric and inhuman; many innocent civilians were killed, and this led to it being interpreted as an attack on the British people as opposed to an attack on the military. Despite this, the idea of bombing German civilians with the intent to murder the innocent population was rejected by the British government. Instead, the bombing of factories in order to damage the industries was seen to be the preferred strategy.

Suss also brings attention to the contrasting stereotypes of airmen and soldiers on the ground. The war in the air was seen to be more prestigious compared to the bloody battles taking place below. Airmen were idealised as war heroes compared to the murderous soldiers.

Suss then discusses the inter-war years in both Britain and Germany. He refers to the theories discussed by Douhet which put forward the idea that air supremacy was essential in wars in order to defeat the war on the home front, not just the front line. In order to succeed in war, the victor must have a superior air force, military, economy and civilian resources, in order to obliterate the enemy on all fronts, this is significant as it highlights the importance of an established air force. Suss suggests that Douhet’s writings had been largely ignored until the 1930’s, when both Britain and Germany began to prepare for an aerial war as both nations began to anticipate the future of air defence.

During the inter-war years, Britain was the only nation to establish an air force in its own right. Suss puts this down to the fear of an apocalyptic-like scene that could be brought upon Britain, particularly after seeing the destruction caused on the Iberian peninsula during the Spanish Civil war. An attempt for morality to be put aside was made by referring to the enemy as insects, in order to justify aerial bombings.

Suss also discusses that in Germany during the inter-war years, a similar desire for air defence was increasing. The oppression that the Treaty of Versailles had imposed on the German population and military meant that they were eager to restore their military preparedness. In Germany, more dramatic measures were taken, for example, by 1935 any man or woman could be called to serve in the Air Defence Service.

Suss closes by highlighting that even following the declaration of war, neither nation was willing to make the first airstrike as both were cautious not to escalate the war. This highlights that despite both nations having spent the majority of the 1930’s preparing for an aerial war, they were both still fearful of the devastation and destruction it could bring.

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Are we there yet? World War 2 and the theory of total war

Roger Chickering, Stig Foster

The beginning of this chapter highlights Total war and to what war in which can be constituted as a total war, it can be seen that a total war is one build up of the mobilization of the populaces in support of the war. This can be made up on the basis of the distinctions between civilians and soldiers and that even though the differences are apparent a successful war cannot be waged on the hierarchy of soldiers in comparison to civilians.

In regard to modern mobilization the first attempts began in the era of the French revolution, this was seen as the era in which the war was described as the people’s war, industrialisation was liberated having provided materials to the new field armies and modern economies, allowing a durable loyalty.  Overall, it can be seen that the marriage of industrialization and recruited armies provided the basis of total war in the 20^th century.

Further in this chapter civilians are deemed a critical part of the war, providing essentials, and providing for allied soldiers, Civilians were  seen as critical to the supply of weapons, munitions, and the other essential materials of combat However, this was seen as a weakness for the civilians as they were considered a crucial part of the war which often allowed principal means of disrupting civilian activity seen as a strategy which was known as the blockade, this continuous strategy destroyed economies within the central powers, following this was the strategic airpower that seen around 740 German’s majority civilians perished in bombing attacks over the period of war.

Chickering and foster also show how the early history of total war suggests that each war was born in one twentieth century European war in anticipation of another in that WW2 represents the fulfilment of trends layout by the First word war. In conclusion it can be seen that this chapter summaries the theory of total war and the war aims, as well as the vulnerability of those on the Homefront.

 

 

The Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the present

By Jay Winter and Antoine Prost

‘Soldiers: How did they wage war?’

Winter and Prost provide a detailed explanation for the historiographical changes that concern the experiences of soldiers during the Great War. Beginning with the historiography at the time of the First World War and continuing until the present day, Winter and Prost discuss the various changes in approach towards studying soldiers and the attitudes of society surrounding them.

During WW1 and the following Inter-War period, historians engaged little with first-hand accounts of soldiers and focused primarily on the politics and big facts of the war. Historians considered the soldier’s perspective as too limited and belonged in the field of literature rather than “serious history” (p.83)

However, accounts and memoirs of soldiers sold well in Europe as citizens wanted to know the hardships their countrymen had endured and preserve the memory of those who had died. However, historians still considered this only excessive literature. (p.87)

It was not until the 60s/70s that British and French historians began taking the soldier’s perspective more seriously. The rise of social, labour, and military history meant there was an interest in first-hand knowledge of the war front as the individual soldier’s experience was needing to be explored. (p.90-91) It was during this time that areas such as psychological impacts, social divisions, resentment, consent, sexual frustration, fear, disobedience, among many other more personal experiences for the solider began to be explored.

There were several hindrances to this new historiographical pursuit. For example, Interwar pacifism made it difficult for some historians to explore the history of combat with support, especially amongst the French Left. Sources were limited for the French since soldier memoirs were not considered official documents, sources had to be approved by the archives. (p.98-9)

What I find noticeable is that the authors suggest that violence has become greatly censored and avoided in recent times, given the grisly decades that followed WW1 has exposed us to the brutal reality of war. (p.101-2) Further, the harrowing accounts of soldiers provide us with a front-row seat to these destructive theatres of the past.

Interestingly, one would expect that these accounts should make us wince and turn away, but this is not the case. Many of us continue to engage with these gruesome sources whether out of respect or fascination and occasionally we are horrified, but perhaps not horrified enough.

Word count: 380

 

Alan Kramer – The burning of Louvain

(Catherine M)

In ‘The Burning of Louvain’ Kramer summarises the events of August-October 1914 as the German army inflicted a wave of massacres and violent destruction on civilian towns in Belgium. The article is split into 4 sections, each focusing on a different aspect of the events.

 

Louvain and the atrocities of 1914

– Kramer summarises the events of Louvain. He uses this section to give context to the events.

-On the 19^th of August 1914 German troops arrived in Louvain, Belgium. All weapons had been confiscated to avoid altercations before their arrival. Yet, the troops falsely identified a threat and began their rampage. 248 killed, 1500 deported, 1120 houses burned, many tortured, and the 14^th century university library destroyed. This was widely seen as an attack on culture and was a focal point of the media coverage.

-He also raised further examples of Dinant and Rheims

 

A ‘German Way of War’? German self-justification and the international response

-Kramer looks deeper into why the violence occurred at both Louvain and other occasions.

-Louvain may not have been premeditated as the town would have been much more use as a base. German soldiers may have shot into the dark misinterpreting each other as francs-tireurs. There were also tensions between the protestant Germans and Catholic Belgians, according to a rector of the university the soldiers only burned the library as they mistook it for the catholic University.

– Though, the massacres at Denant were clearly premeditated and the soldiers had orders to destroy.

 

International law in 1914

-Belgium went to the USA for help against the German crimes against culture and civilisation as they were leading in international law. Germany had signed the Hauge convention yet did not adhere to the rules. Kramer provides evidence that German soldiers were specifically trained to avoid them as these didn’t comply with the ‘German viewpoint.’

 

The Intellectuals response to atrocities

-The opinions of intellectuals are often an important viewpoint to consider. Kramer uses this section to look at the response of scientists, scholars, and artists who had close links and access to international academic communities.

-These German intellectuals were largely on the side of the troops. They believed it is worth destroying valuable culture to save lives. When artist Ferdinand Hodler signed a protest ginst the destruction he was quickly, completely disowned by the German arts community.

Overall, Kramers article was very easy to follow. He made great use of evidence and no point he made was unsupported, and in a way that let them speak for themselves. This came across very matter of fact and read as though each angle of the event had been analysed.