Suss, ‘ The War of the Future’ (Morgan M)
In this chapter, Suss focuses on aerial warfare during the First World War and then during the inter-war period until 1939. He first discusses how during the First World War; aerial warfare was not yet advanced, and it was primarily the use of Zeppelins used in order to attack the enemy on their home soil. Suss describes the attacks on London as significant as it was highlighted for the first time that the British population could not be safeguarded despite being far from the fighting on the front line. These German air raids were described by the British people as barbaric and inhuman; many innocent civilians were killed, and this led to it being interpreted as an attack on the British people as opposed to an attack on the military. Despite this, the idea of bombing German civilians with the intent to murder the innocent population was rejected by the British government. Instead, the bombing of factories in order to damage the industries was seen to be the preferred strategy.
Suss also brings attention to the contrasting stereotypes of airmen and soldiers on the ground. The war in the air was seen to be more prestigious compared to the bloody battles taking place below. Airmen were idealised as war heroes compared to the murderous soldiers.
Suss then discusses the inter-war years in both Britain and Germany. He refers to the theories discussed by Douhet which put forward the idea that air supremacy was essential in wars in order to defeat the war on the home front, not just the front line. In order to succeed in war, the victor must have a superior air force, military, economy and civilian resources, in order to obliterate the enemy on all fronts, this is significant as it highlights the importance of an established air force. Suss suggests that Douhet’s writings had been largely ignored until the 1930’s, when both Britain and Germany began to prepare for an aerial war as both nations began to anticipate the future of air defence.
During the inter-war years, Britain was the only nation to establish an air force in its own right. Suss puts this down to the fear of an apocalyptic-like scene that could be brought upon Britain, particularly after seeing the destruction caused on the Iberian peninsula during the Spanish Civil war. An attempt for morality to be put aside was made by referring to the enemy as insects, in order to justify aerial bombings.
Suss also discusses that in Germany during the inter-war years, a similar desire for air defence was increasing. The oppression that the Treaty of Versailles had imposed on the German population and military meant that they were eager to restore their military preparedness. In Germany, more dramatic measures were taken, for example, by 1935 any man or woman could be called to serve in the Air Defence Service.
Suss closes by highlighting that even following the declaration of war, neither nation was willing to make the first airstrike as both were cautious not to escalate the war. This highlights that despite both nations having spent the majority of the 1930’s preparing for an aerial war, they were both still fearful of the devastation and destruction it could bring.
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Are we there yet? World War 2 and the theory of total war
Roger Chickering, Stig Foster
The beginning of this chapter highlights Total war and to what war in which can be constituted as a total war, it can be seen that a total war is one build up of the mobilization of the populaces in support of the war. This can be made up on the basis of the distinctions between civilians and soldiers and that even though the differences are apparent a successful war cannot be waged on the hierarchy of soldiers in comparison to civilians.
In regard to modern mobilization the first attempts began in the era of the French revolution, this was seen as the era in which the war was described as the people’s war, industrialisation was liberated having provided materials to the new field armies and modern economies, allowing a durable loyalty. Overall, it can be seen that the marriage of industrialization and recruited armies provided the basis of total war in the 20th century.
Further in this chapter civilians are deemed a critical part of the war, providing essentials, and providing for allied soldiers, Civilians were seen as critical to the supply of weapons, munitions, and the other essential materials of combat However, this was seen as a weakness for the civilians as they were considered a crucial part of the war which often allowed principal means of disrupting civilian activity seen as a strategy which was known as the blockade, this continuous strategy destroyed economies within the central powers, following this was the strategic airpower that seen around 740 German’s majority civilians perished in bombing attacks over the period of war.
Chickering and foster also show how the early history of total war suggests that each war was born in one twentieth century European war in anticipation of another in that WW2 represents the fulfilment of trends layout by the First word war. In conclusion it can be seen that this chapter summaries the theory of total war and the war aims, as well as the vulnerability of those on the Homefront.
In my opinion, the role of civilians in the war effort is underestimated. Too often, they are considered passive: they are either conscripts, mere casualties or workers in the war industry.
Yet, given the efforts put in propaganda and the constant work of governments against demoralization, public opinion probably mattered more than what is usually described. In the end, isn’t “total war” more of a collective mindset with economic consequences (i.e. the mobilization of material resources)?
As a soldier in WWII you knew that you were signing up for war, but civilians weren’t asked for consent for being part of a total war. I found it quite striking the statistic of the civilian vs battlefront deaths of the second world war in Chickering and Forster. It really highlights the cost to civilian life as those who were supposed to have no part in it -save supplying ammunition- had their lives taken, including children. The most memorable events of this war were the holocaust and the nuclear bombings, both attacks on civilians. To me this makes the point that total war doesn’t particularly mean battles, frontline fighting, and destruction in every corner of participating countries, but more that every member of the population is immediately involved and put at risk involuntarily.
Thanks Morgan and Chloe for these summaries. I don’t, however, see any comments on Glienke. It’s good to see an emphasis on the home front and the importance of civilians, which is precisely what we’ll be discussing in the seminar. I’m not quite sure what you refer to when describing “durable loyalty”. Perhaps this is related to what is emerging in the comments, which seems to me a way of connecting the idea of “war culture” and “total war”. What is the relationship between the two? To add Suss to the conversation: it seems that his emphasis on novels, films and plans around warfare suggests a “war culture” in peacetime…
I agree with Nicolas in his opinion that the role of the civilian is under estimated. Although Chloe points out very well that many had a role in providing munitions and weapons they were also pivotal in providing moral which without war could not be sustained. Glinke’s reading offers a German perspective and I would agree with Peter Heinl’s argument that the air war affected the whole German population either indirectly or directly. German civilians had to deal with the constant threat of being bombed and in early 1945 there was the destruction of the city centres of Nuremberg, Wuzburg and Dresden therefore destroying millions of homes. In Berlin 1.5 million homeless by March 1944. This led to civilians having to seek refuge/shelter and they were stripped of basic commodities such as food or furniture. Many were evacuated but this enticed unrest within the local population and many evacuees were denied shelter by the owner. The hardship civilians face is furthered in the Chickering reading and it is even stated that civilians became a preferred target of military violence – even more so than soldiers.
I also completely agree with Morgan regarding the idea that the Germans were depicted as “cruel” in their killing of innocent civilians and in contrast how the British were initially taking a “chivalrous” approach. And how war in the air was a ‘noble confrontation’ comparative to that on the bloody battlefields on ground.
I agree with Morgan’s summary of Suss’ article. It is interesting to see the British response to the Zeppelin bombings in London as they were seen as ‘political bombings’. While Britain, as Morgan said, focused its attacks on military targets – Germany’s air raids were aimed at the innocent. I also found it interesting that Britain did not engage in terror bombings which proved controversial for Britain’s bombing strategy in WWII – highlighted in Glienke’s chapter as he notes that more than one quarter of German houses were damaged.
I think Suss explains that the air was another battlefield and someone was able to dominate the skies with the new aerial technologies in WWII.
I find it quite interesting that it appears to be more acceptable to bomb factories over cities. I can see the argument of there being fewer people in factories, and probably fewer children as well, but the people working in factories were likely to be civilians as well. Besides, if a family loses a factory worker, it would mean a loss of money for the whole family, indirectly putting in danger the rest of the family as well.
I think aerial warfare was seen as more heroic because war appears a lot more “clean”, less bloody, and impersonal than “traditional” war on the ground. There’s a form of detachment here, as the soldiers won’t see their victims die. It is further implied when they use the term ‘insects’ to qualify their targets.