Suss, ‘The War of the Future’ (Alix B)
In this chapter, Suss describes the time of war in the introduction of aerial bombing and aerial warfare that started in the 20th century during the First World War. Suss describes the different ways people felt towards the changing of war life as we know it, some people were excited whilst others terrified and fleeing from big cities.
He firstly discusses the type of aerial warfare used specifically the germans use of Zeppelins to attack the enemy in their homeland. The attack on London from Germany was the first time Britain was attacked on home soil and this riddled fear and panic amongst civilians. The use of aerial bombing during the First World War was proven not to be the main factor in winning the war but it was definitely significant in effecting the emotions and the moral of citizens in large cities especially with munitions factories being a main target. Suss discusses how the people of Britain for the first time did not feel some on their home soil, that an attack like that could happen again at any time and fighting on the front line wasn’t enough anymore.
Suss also discusses the difference in strategies to bombing that Germany and Britain had. The German bombing was described as inhumane and barbaric due to it hitting a high populated place of civilians whereas Britain’s retaliation in the same way with intent to kill civilians was declined by the government. Instead large factories and industrial areas were to be hit instead as Britain seen themselves creating a state of ‘total war’ if they retaliated in the way of killing innocent civilians. Aerial bombing now put forward what the future of wars would look like describing it as a miracle of warfare.
The pilots were seen as honourable and noble men fighting a clean war, the were called ‘the Knight of the Skies’ in comparison to the bloody soldiers that were in the battle fields below and being labeled as murders the pilots watched from above and were idealised as heroes.
Suss then moves on to the inter-war period in Britain and in Germany. He notes that wars in the future would change as fighting each other on the front line in battle was not enough, the victor of any war would be the nation with the best military, economic and civilian resources and being able to wipe out enemy resources in their own territory not in a battlefield. In Britain it was made sure that when aerial bombing was discussed the morale of the civilians and keeping it high was the main priority so when it was discussed it was made inhumane so it didn’t sound like innocent lives being lost it looked more like just a number to them than a human being.
I found it disturbing that British morale was affected immensely after the London attack but Britain was using the same type of attack on the colonies against protesters and tribes who they weren’t even at war with.
However, in Germany after the First World War and the Treaty of Versailles now in place it banned the possession of military aircraft. Germany recognised how important air defences was becoming as they knew something much bigger was to come and prepared the people of Germany in better air attacks resulting in a higher moral in comparison to British morale.
Suss ends the chapter by saying neither Britain or Germany wanted to be the first to start the aerial warfare but if anything was to happen the RAF had the go ahead to succeed with maximum effectiveness, but, the only thing that happened was a false alarm on the day war was declared in September 1939 which was accidentally set off by two British pilots. Suss notes that for the reminder of the time London and Berlin both reminded quiet.
Glienke, ‘The Allied Air War’
In this chapter, Glienke discusses Air Warfare in the Second World War and the huge effects which it had on German society and the German population, both directly and indirectly. He points out two main approaches of historians on the impact of air war on Germans with Groehler who believed that it only really effected a specific portion of German society, and Heinl who argues that the impact of air war was far reaching as he puts forward the psychological perspective of this aspect of war. Glienke views seem to align more with Heinl’s.
The direct impacts of air warfare on Germany are seen more in the targeted cities through the destruction of houses and other buildings, which had huge consequences. With this destruction came problems such as poverty and homelessness, which were severe problems as by March 1944 there were 1.5 million homeless people in Berlin alone. Along with these issues, the need for units to put out fires, set up emergency medical care and find emergency accommodation became overwhelming. There were also Armed Forces Units sent to clear unexploded bombs and save those who had been buried in the explosions. All of these jobs required labour which there was a shortage of, therefore they resorted to the use of convicts and concentration camp prisoners, who also required guards to be present putting a further strain on the country.
Glienke also discusses the indirect impacts that people all across Germany experienced as a result of the bombings. Even if they were not living in a city, which were often targeted more, the fear and anxiety of being bombed or their loved ones being bombed was hugely impactful on the lives of Germans. The lack of sleep due to the sirens or anxiety led to a decrease in production from workers which had an impact on the economy. The main concern of Germans was the victims of these bombings, however propaganda focused on the destruction of German cultural monuments and architecture in order to encourage more hatred towards the allies. With no information on the deaths and victims, people began to find their own sources through friends, relatives etc, which caused for a lot of rumours being spread. For example, the raid in Wuppertal in 1943 had left 1800 dead, but in the rumours being spread this number was 10,000-12,000. Glienke makes a clear argument that the air raids effected all Germans not just specific segments of the population, just in various ways as individual regions had different fears.
Chickering and Forster, ‘Are We There Yet?’
In this article, Chickering and Forster explore the definition of ‘total war’ in relation to WW2. This is achieved through their examination of the nature of this war in comparison to two previous major wars: the American Civil War and WW1.
Chickering and Forster explore “total war” through Gordon Wright’s definition of the “ideal type”. This emphasises the importance of civilians in the war, as workforce for the war efforts and as targets. They go on to explain that with “total war” the distinction between soldiers and civilians doesn’t exist as civilians became the preferred targets of military attacks. This emphasis on the importance of civilians as targets can be seen in the comparison between the number of soldiers killed in theatres of war, which is 15 million, to the number of civilians killed sitting at 45 million. Civilians were central to the fight in WW2 which was not previously seen on this scale.
Chickering and Forster explore WW1 in relation to “total war” and conclude that it lacked key features of “total war” as it was limited in scope due to the stalemate and in the military violence against civilians. However, they state that “total war” was partially the product of WW1 due to the essential role of the mobilisation of civilians which is a critical feature of “total war”. Air Warfare is also something that separates WW2 from WW1, as it was crucial in the attacks on civilians.
However, Chickering and Forster also discuss the limitations of WW2 in it’s totality. While WW2 was fought on a global scale, it was mainly concentrated in one area which is not a typical feature of “total war”. It was also limited in it’s totality as women were excluded from combat roles. Chickering and Forster also state that German life on the Home front was not as disrupted as in WW1, which would limit the war in it’s totality also.