The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022 was considered unimaginable, a protracted land conflict in Europe had not occurred since the end of the 2nd World War, there was no reason to believe war was around the corner, right? In reality, such a protracted conflict was inevitable – at least from the perspective of the Russian establishment and its machinations.
Contemporary analysis on the reasonings behind such a bold move has been dishearteningly lacking in western media outlets, chalking up the invasion to the whims of a crazy man, or Russia’s fear of a border with NATO (which they have had for almost two decades).
Indeed, it shall be argued the invasion of Ukraine was the result of several economic and political push and pull factors that Russia has been grappling with for some time, ultimately determining that the timing of the conflict was not the blundering action of a foolish man, but rather planned and timed as best as possible to give Russia the highest chance of success.
The Push
It is hard to fathom, but the economic and political realities Russia faces may constitute effective permanent decline and resignation to a secondary or tertiary global power. This is the underlying fear, the push factors, that drive the Russian political machinery, and they may be right to be fearful.
Russia is, by all metrics, a petrostate. A state whose entire economy is geared towards the extraction, refining, transportation and selling of oil and natural gas. Since the end of the 2nd World War, Europe has been by far the largest buyer and consumer of Russian oil and natural gas. As a result, the Soviet Union was able to challenge the US for global hegemony. Today however, demand for oil and natural gas is less than it once was, and demand will only get lower. Diversification in the European energy market to nuclear, renewables and other energy suppliers like the US for LNG has exacerbated the issue. Russia has nowhere else to turn to sell its resources, at least not for the same price or quantity, with China able to negotiate bilateral trade from an immense position of strength, being resource rich itself.
In conjunction with oil exports Russia imports a majority of its manufactured goods, a large quantity from Europe, a market that Russia is slowly but surely losing influence over. After years of sanctions and even longer political and economic isolation, Russia simply does not possess enough manufacturing power to cater for itself domestically, never mind sustaining a war-economy level of production to combat NATO or the rising power of China.
Russia’s population is still relatively young in comparison to its western rivals; however, the Russian population is also rapidly, faster than in Western Europe. This may be the last generation where Russia will have a proportionally younger population than their contemporary rivals, and therefore the last generation whereby Russia could feasibly engage in protracted conflict with any hope of success.
It is also not hard to imagine that the institutions of Russia are keenly aware of Vladimir Putin’s limited lifespan, so too I imagine is he. It is unlikely that any war for the survival of Russia would be waged by the institutions of Russia absent of Putin’s bold leadership, nor would Putin allow it.
We have all be shocked by the conflict in Ukraine, mainly by how Ukraine survived an initial decapitation attempt and how it has managed to push back the so-called “second army of the world”. Surprising to us, perhaps not as surprising to the officials and institutions who saw the necessity of such a bold action to begin with, with the clock of Russia’s permanent decline ticking away.
The Pull
So why February the 24th 2022 and why Ukraine?
The beginning of the invasion occurred following several months of high-priced oil sales due to, at the time, the ongoing COVID pandemic. Disruptions in global supply chains and the price hike in oil meant that Russia was generating more revenue from oil production than normal and held a shadow over Europe in the form of much needed cheaper energy supplies, which only Russia could provide. The uptick in income and bargaining chip over Europe may have been enough to give Russia the push it needed, already embolden by the lack of cohesive meaningful response to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and the lack of military response from a, then, small and underfunded Ukrainian force.
Ukraine has a large population of 43 million, which is also relatively young. This is combined with a large Russian diaspora, consisting of around 8 million ethnically Russian people, living in a state that was once considered friendly to Russia not so long ago under the leadership of Viktor Yanukovych. Perhaps more importantly, Russia had run out of options, and if left alone any longer Ukraine too might have joined NATO, effectively marking the end of Russian influence westward.
Ukraine is also economically important to Russia in both the short and long term. Integrating Ukraine would have meant the saving of billions of dollars every year in pipeline fees, the acquisition of; impressive infrastructure from nuclear power plants to hydroelectric dams, a large manufacturing sector, one of the largest agricultural sectors in the world, and several natural resources from coal to natural gas. As well as secure all-year-round Black Sea port access no longer under threat in an isolated Crimea.
Conclusion
For the Russian establishment and institutions, the invasion of Ukraine was a matter of “if not now, then never”. The economic and political factors that Russia is facing are significant, and Russia’s place within the global economic and political order is, to Russian policy makers, most certainly threatened enough to warrant the first protracted land war in Europe since the 2nd World War.
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