The Winds of Change in Europe
By Katherine Rosenius
Finland, Sweden and Russia have a very intertwined history, featuring numerous wars and shifts in borders. This article will focus mainly on Finland and Russia, where much of the reasoning behind Finland’s application to NATO applies to Sweden’s application as well.
The decision by Finland to apply to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an unprecedented shift in the politics of Europe, much like the controversial Brexit decision made by the United Kingdom in 2016.
As a nation with a population roughly equal to that of Scotland at 5.5 million and a tenuous history with Russia, Finland is not known for bold international claims, demands, or making a fuss in general. In fact, the term Finlandization was coined in the 1960s to denote a smaller country refraining from challenging, in any way, its larger and more powerful neighbour – in this case, Russia.
Over the years leading up to the present day, a mostly healthy and mutually beneficial relationship has been cultivated between Finland and Russia, only to begin rapidly deteriorating because of events unfolding on the global political stage today, particularly in Ukraine.
The terms under which Finland and Russia have successfully co-operated have changed over the years, but one constant has remained: Finland is not to join NATO. Since NATO’s start, Russian leadership has dreaded the prospect of the western coalition having access to the 1340-kilometer-long border Finland shares with Russia.
Directly east of the northernmost Finnish border lies the Murmansk region of Russia, which houses the Northern Fleet’s headquarters and main base, the largest naval base in Russia, as well as additional bases around the area.
The strategic significance of this location should not be understated – a previous border connection for NATO forces to Murmansk exists through northern Norway but covers a significantly smaller area and only allows a small corridor of entry – the addition of Finland’s border, however, poses a much more serious threat for Russia in the event of a NATO invasion.
The reason this is relevant is that it puts Russian leadership in an even more demanding situation than they have already carved for themselves. If the Russian regime had previously been anxious over their shared border with NATO, their worries would surely peak as the border doubled.
The fear is that Russia would become even more reckless as more countries take a seemingly hostile stance towards them. In essence, if Russia perceives the west to be gearing towards war with them, Russia will certainly do the same.
While the topic of joining NATO has been on the minds of many in Finland for a long time, the beforementioned Finlandization effect has always prevented serious talks of applying, but in the past decade, events such as the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing invasion of Ukraine have caused public opinion in Finland to shift dramatically in favour of NATO.
According to polls orchestrated by Yle, Finland’s national broadcasting company, in 2017, only 21% of the population were in favor of joining, while in 2022 that number had soared to 62% in March 2022 and 76% in May. These polls signal a sense of uncertainty and escalation of fear amongst Finns. The extent to which Russia will negatively react to Finland joining NATO is unknown and is one of the sources of uncertainty.
When asked about the conflict, John Ahlbom, a Finnish politics student at University of Stirling voices “I think that we don’t really need to join NATO because we have a strong military which is based wholly on defending Finland from a potential Russian invasion, the potential for conflict is in my mind increased by joining NATO, because of article 5.” NATO´s Article 5 articulates that an attack against one or several of its members is an attack against all, in other words, NATO offers Finland collective defence, and this is something a lot of Finns are aware of.”
John continues “[We] just have to assume that the people in power have assessed the situation and there must be a reason for them to reach a different conclusion, but I also think a lot of it has to do with social pressure – it is seen as `the right move´ by a lot of people who actually don’t have a lot of information at hand and maybe don’t know as much about our defense forces, NATO, or international relations in general.
“While I am skeptical, I can say with certainty that I also see a silver lining in joining NATO. First and foremost, should the worst occur, we would as a matter of fact be better off as a NATO member if we were invaded, as help is always welcome even though you believe in yourself. Secondly, Finland has struggled to make decisions that wouldn’t sit well with Russia ever since WW2, but with the backing of NATO Finland could finally stop appeasing Russia.”
Antti Kaikkonen, the Finnish defense minister vocalizes on YLE TV1 that “Finland is not facing an immediate military threat, but we must look to the future as well. Finland must prepare for the use or the threat of use of military force, against it as well as for political pressure”
The relationship between Finland and Russia may not have been equal but has been stable for a long time. The events unfolding globally have forced this relationship into drastic changes, and in such a brief time, it may be worth considering what other previously unachievable changes may be coming to Europe, and which countries are next.