Violence and Community Sven Reichardt – James C.
Reichardt’s article tells us that the SA’S ‘sturm 33’ was particularly known for street fighting in Germany. The methods employed by them meant that in cases of attacks there was no doubt as to who was responsible for it. The members all shared the same aims, and that the SA became a way of life for its members. The article talks of ‘comradeship’ which I think is an interesting choice of word as it suggests unity among them. The unity in this case links to the glorification of violence. The SA is united in its hate for Communists, Social Democrats, and Jewish people. The strategy of violence was successful the bloodshed experienced brough publicity that gave the Nazis a platform to further their ambitions. The SA troops were male dominated, young, and uncompromising. The marches they had gave them the character of an anti-socialist workers movement. Every unit was led by a Sturmfuher a chosen Nazi leader. The leader was a man of the people with particular allegiance towards them. To ensure the leaders survival there had to be what Reichardt says as a ‘rigid and loose power relationship with the followers.’ In the case of the SA-Sturm 33 their Leader Hahn felt a special affinity to the military and had joined an anti-Semitic organisation prior to becoming leader of the SA-Strum 33. This shows that Hahn was a proper candidate to lead this SA group as he was experienced and had paramilitary experience. The article discusses reasons why young men joined the SA. It was often linked to unemployment. The great depression had left a lasting effect on Germany and many SA agents signed up because they were unemployed. This connection as made by a Social Democrat Newspaper who states the connection was a ‘self-evident mechanism.’ Unemployment within the SA was often high and conveys the idea that the SA was a poor underfunded organisation. The movement was attractive to the young men as their slogans suggested there could be radical change and that this could be achieved through demonstrations etc. Reichardt states that a descending social trajectory was responsible for an increase in membership of the Charlottenburg SA. They often felt they did not belong to a particular group and found solace in the SA. The SA offered a network of contacts that removed the feeling of social isolationism. It envisaged men to have a better future. The groups attacks were often linked to violent outbursts due to excessive alcohol consumption. They often carried out attacks so they could get praise from the Sturmfuhrer and respect among their comrades. This was how physical violence became an acceptance within the group.
Chris Millington ‘Street fighting men: Political Violence in Inter-War France’ by Robert Canth
In his article “Street Fighting men” Chris Millington argues that the prevalence of violence in the inter-war third republican France is often over-looked and not sufficiently analysed, compared to its European contemporaries of belligerence, such as Germany and Britain. He narrates how the nature of the violence was different and highly symbolic due to inherently democratic political circumstances in France; referring to the ‘highly influential’ thesis of Serge Berstein. Statistically, France seemed to have been less violent to other European states under political upheaval, even though the concerned groups made constant threats in the press. However, Millington argues that mere numbers alone can not elaborate the violent nature of society at the time. What interests me, is why Millington does not mention how the outcome of the war might have affected the prevalence of such violence, for while the war had been bitter and devastating for all, the amount of humiliation and the eventual search for the culprits in Germany surely played its part.
Millington discusses how the ‘legitimate and illegitimate violence’ by the notions of ‘manliness’ were manifestations of a ‘bitter struggle’ between the right and the left. He refers to how the different parliamentary entities – some of which had turned totalitarian, conducted themselves in the struggle for political dominance in the 1920 and how France saw the emergence of the Extreme right, while the left under the left-wing Cartel Des Gauches eventually failed to topple the government. While talking about how ‘the Communist Party had abandoned the idea of using a proletarian militia’ by the late 1920s, the article points out how later the worldwide economic depression also affected the rise of the far-right in groups such as Solidarité Française (SF) and Croix de Feu (CF). Millington describes how such tensions led to an escalation in 1934, when the nationalist riot against government corruption took place claiming multiple casualties.
The article emphasizes how the public encounters between the groups was an important aspect to assert dominance and Millington proceeds to describe them in detail, for example how the weaponry consisted mainly of items suited for hand to hand combat such as knuckledusters and knives. He also argues that the leagues and the communists made sure to recruit the right calibre of men to their shock-troop and defence sections.
After describing vividly the events of the turbulent 1920s and 1930s the article concludes on how the enemies of the republic failed to seize control like in Italy and Germany. The article does not point out how the result of the German invasion could have been unifying in terms of how the political violence ended, par the left wing attacks on the German forces and the eventual executions of 10 000 collaborators.
I agree that it’s interesting the way the SA’s members are described to have ‘comradeship,’ the one thing the country generally didn’t have at the time was a sense of national pride. I think the appeal of the SA was the promise of structure, unity, and shared national pride that many Germans craved.
It’s also interesting to see how through this creation of a sense of community of shared contempt and violence, the Nazis were able to build up an incredibly strong paramilitary force that targeted the minorities they wished to eradicate by creating an outlet for unrest that was mainly due to other causes (Versailles, Weimar and the Economy.)
Thanks, James, for this blog. I think the emphasis on downward social trajectory is particularly important; there has often been an association between unemployment and this kind of radicalism, but it seems to me that a downward trajectory makes a lot more sense.
What do you think of this approach to paramilitarism in general? Does Reichardt help us to understand this as a phenomenon? What are the limits of his approach?
I think James’ post really shows how the appeal of paramilitary causes was due to a combination of factors rather than the “brutalisation” thesis. He shows that there were psychological draws such as charismatic leadership and comradery, as well as economic pushes such as unemployment and sociological issues such as social isolationism. Clearly, there is no single correct answer to the attraction of paramilitarism.
As James mentioned, the argument of being able to bring change to society must have been one of the main reasons why such movements attracted that many young people. I think, even now, it’s very easy to see how a lot of us would also be attracted to a movement offering a sense of belonging and the ability to reshape society.
Of course, the hatred on which these movements were based, such as antisemitism, would certainly be seen today as efficient enough to deter us from joining. But at the time, most people didn’t actually care that much about Jews, and if anyone in those movements were actually concerned about how the Jewish population was treated, they probably saw it as a necessary evil in achieving the movement’s goals. To belong to a group, you have to obey its norms, which in this case was violence.
I agree with James, ‘comradeship’ is a strange way to describe the SA but it does highlight how they were unified through violence. This ‘comradeship’ was created through their mutual hatred towards the Jewish community, Communists and Social Democrats. Reichardt emphasises that civilians joined in order to regain an emotional bond which was lost after the First World War, so although they were joining a violent organisation the appeal of being part of a community was far greater.
Storm Troopers also had their own taverns, so I believe drinking culture also had a role to play in the violence they carried out. For example, the primary source which detailed the rally in Berlin, 1927. The rally took place in a beer hall and “within three or four minutes” violence erupted.
I think Reichardt’s article on Nazi storm troopers is particularly interesting and I think James emphasises well the age of the SA men and how young they were. The average age in 1933 was 25 and 87% were too young to have fought in WW1. This arguably came about due to a widespread nationalistic militarism among the young German generation who had grown up during WW1 and this aided the SA. The Great Depression (1929) and rife unemployment also led people down a path of political radicalism.
Reichardt also discusses how men did not feel as if they were members of a party organisation but rather members of a local community, marked by close personal bonds, almost family-like. This emphasises the community level and spirit within the SA. They were unified through violence and through shared hatred. Lastly, I also agree with Nicola and her point about the influence of a drinking culture and its links with the outbreaks of violence.